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Abstract
The July 2007 general elections took place in an atmosphere of
polarization around debates concerning the changing nature of the Turkish
political regime. The election victory for the incumbent Justice and
Development Party (AKP) seemed to depend on two competing sources of
influence upon voters in their choice for political parties. One was
primarily long-term ideological orientations built on left-right self-
placement, religiosity, and conservatism. The other was relatively short-
term evaluations of government performance, especially on the economic
front. This essay evaluates these two branches of influence upon voters’
choice, using survey data collected before and after the July election.
Ali Çarkoğlu is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Arts
and Social Sciences at Sabancı University, Istanbul. Email:
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A shorter version of this article is due to appear in the Turkish Studies in
2008.
3After a long and polarizing debate over the candidates, procedures,
and implications of the election for the president of the Republican
regime—which was established in 1923 upon strictly secularist
principles—the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet
Meclisi, TBMM), controlled by the ruling Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), failed, in May 2007, to elect the eleventh
president of the Republic. At the time, this peak of tensions could have
been seen as a catastrophe that would end the momentous tenure of the
AKP. The AKP had been in power since the general elections in 2002, when
it received about 34 percent of the popular vote, placing it in a position to
control just a few seats less than a two-thirds majority of the TBMM.  A few1
weeks before the election in mid-April 2007, the notoriously sensitive and
interventionist military had become part of the debate when a tactless and
unsigned decree criticizing the government for its allegedly Islamist stand
on critical issues appeared on its official website. Almost
contemporaneously, large protests were held in all major cities, and the
legal basis for the presidential election was being challenged by the main
opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,
CHP), in the Constitutional Court. Facing increasing pressure from all
sides, the AKP was forced to call for early elections about three and a half
months earlier than originally scheduled.  2
The resulting election seems to have ended most of the political
uncertainties and debates concerning the political potency of the AKP.
Given the strong commitment of the AKP to European Union (EU)
membership for Turkey, the election also signified a renewed vote of
confidence in membership negotiations with the EU. Despite
incompatibilities with the ideational bases of the AKP, the EU ideals and
more concrete policy devotions for further democratization in the country
seemed to have found a rejuvenated commitment at the highest executive
level. 
The 2007 elections also mark a turning point in the long-lasting
Kurdish conflict. Both the militarized secessionist movement in the east
and southeast provinces as well as the ten percent threshold for
parliamentary representation have over the last two decades played an
4impeding role for representation of the “Kurdish identity” in Turkish
politics. Although citizens of Kurdish origin can freely engage in politics,
public service, business, and other walks of life in the country, any
assumption of a distinct ethnic identity in the public realm and demands
for its official recognition has been effectively curtailed within the Turkish
polity. In the past the Kurdish political leadership, under the strong
influence of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has a record of
targeting civilian targets, chose to remain on the sidelines by running on a
nationwide platform that effectively kept them out of the TBMM, for their
vote share was nowhere near the ten percent threshold. In 2007 however,
the Kurdish political leadership chose to run their candidates as
independents, thus bypassing the threshold requirement. They won 20
seats as independents and therefore were able to form a parliamentary
group in the TBMM. 
Equally significant in this development is the fact that in the east and
southeastern provinces where citizens of Kurdish origin constitute a
dominant group, the AKP remained very competitive, effectively receiving
more votes than the independent candidates supported by the ethnic
Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP).3
Concurrently, the nationalists that were pushed below the ten percent
threshold and thus out of the TBMM in the 2002 elections were also back
above the threshold in 2007, with about 14 percent of the vote. The main
opposition in the aftermath of the 2002 elections, the CHP, gained slightly
more than its 2002 share to reach about 21 percent of the vote and maintain
its main opposition role. However, given the high tensions before the
elections, which seemed to favor the opposition, the CHP’s performance in
the general election was well below expectations. 
The second general election victory for the AKP is significant since it
seems to depend on two competing sources of influence upon voters in
their choice for political parties. One is primarily long-term ideological
orientations built on left-right self-placement, religiosity, and conservatism.
The other is relatively short-term evaluations of government performance,
especially on the economic front. Below, these two branches of influence
upon voters’ choice are evaluated, using survey data collected before and
after the July 2007 elections. 
5I. IDEOLOGY VERSUS ECONOMIC PRAGMATISM?
The two competing hypotheses about the shaping of voter decisions
in 2007 are rooted in two major features of Turkish politics in the post-1980
coup period. The first is the relatively recent phenomenon of the collapse
of the traditional center-right and its concurrent replacement by the parties
of the pro-Islamist electoral tradition that forms the intellectual and
organizational backbone of the AKP. This collapse is strongly linked to
continual failure on the economic front by the governments under the
control of the center-right parties. The second is a relatively much longer-
term development of a dual nature in Turkish society, setting the
“peripheral” forces of the rural and relatively more religious, conservative
masses against the “center” bureaucracy and its supporters among
relatively less religious and socioeconomically better off segments of
Turkish society. Şerif Mardin’s center-periphery framework is a subtle and
long-term sociohistorical depiction of Turkish society.  During the Ottoman4
period, the center controlled the imperial house and its various coalitions.
Its essential political nature remained unchanged during the Republican
period, especially with regard to the various ways in which it related to the
periphery and dominated the political scene.  5
The “center” is culturally more self-confident and effectively controls
the state and its political apparatus. The primary social groups comprising
the modern-day reflections of the “center” are the quasi-autonomous
bureaucracy, especially of the security circles; various layers of mostly
state-dependent businesses; and the various branches of the intellectual
community and academia. 
The central elites shaped the social and economic reforms in the early
decades of the Republic, almost in negligence of the opposition by the
peripheral forces. The periphery’s rise began with free elections in 1950.
Competitive party politics irrevocably gave incentives to the political elites
aspiring to appeal for the support of the periphery, for provision of
primarily their pragmatic economic demands in the early decades within
clientelistic networks. However, more subtle cultural and ideological
demands were also heard and given priority in the policy agenda. Such
demands eventually were responsible in shaping the rising electoral appeal
of Islamist movements with a political agenda. After more than three
6decades of electoral maneuvering, the pro-Islamist tradition managed to
exploit the failure of the center-right-wing to raise its electoral support to
winning positions in the mid-1990s. In 1995, the Welfare Party (Refah
Partisi, RP) became the first party with a pro-Islamist background to
capture the largest share of popular vote. However, their coming to power
as a coalition with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) resulted in
rising tensions with the centrist elites and especially the military. The
eventual outcome was the so-called February 28 process, which marked a
continual oversight by the military over the civilian government policies
that were somehow linked to the secularist principles of the Republic. The
February 28, 1997 meeting of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik
Kurulu, MGK) marked the beginning of the so-called “process,” which
witnessed the issuance of a list of demands by the military members of the
MGK from the civilian government. As a consequence of this very meeting,
the RP-led coalition had to leave office and was replaced by a more centrist
minority coalition government. However, it would be wrong to assume
that the civilians had verbatim followed the military’s orders at any point
in this process. Although the military continuously insisted in subsequent
MGK meetings and on other occasions that their infamous list of demands
issued on February 28 was not being followed by the civilians, their
reproach remained mostly unanswered. 
Among the most important consequences of this “process” is the
reshaping of the pro-Islamist political movement by the younger
generation of political entrepreneurs led by the ex-mayor of Istanbul,
Tayyip Erdoğan, whose strong pro-Islamist credentials did not impede him
from taking on a remarkable reformist political agenda first within the pro-
Islamist tradition and then within the larger Turkish polity. First his close
political confrere, Abdullah Gül, challenged the old-generation pro-Islamist
cadres in the first party congress of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) in
May 2000, when he lost to the old-generation candidate, Recai Kutan, by a
small margin. However, this proved only to be a temporary setback. In
August 2001, the younger generation’s revolt against the older generation
led to the founding of the AKP under Erdoğan’s leadership. Erdoğan and
Gül led the party into the early elections of November 2002, in which they
gained a dominant majority in the TBMM. The AKP government continued
7the EU adjustment reforms with unprecedented determination. 
This transformation of the pro-Islamist camp gave rise to a
paradoxical development in its secularist counterpart, which grew
increasingly skeptical of the democratization reforms entailed in the EU
membership project of the past decade. In this new phase of political
competition, the “center” remains threatened by the democratic demands
from the periphery, with their newly adopted EU standards. This has been
manifested most in the debates about the ethnic and cultural rights of
citizens of Kurdish origin. The liberalization debates around the ban on
women wearing the Islamist turban participating in higher education,
however, has not been received favorably by the strictly secularist
European Court of Human Rights and remains an issue supported
primarily by the AKP. The military as the natural protector of the Kemalist
Republic constitutes a crucial element in the alliance that forms the
“centrist” coalition. Although this rhetoric of the protector of the Republic
takes on an undemocratic tone, it also reflects a natural extension of
secularist reactionism during the AKP era.  6
Historically, the “periphery” remains a frequently uncontrollable and
hostile mass of heterogeneous character. The heterogeneity is primarily a
consequence of cultural differences within the “peripheral” tradition. The
peripheral coalition is most powerful in the rural as well as in the newly
urbanized segments of society and includes a rich variety of sectarian
groups of primarily Sunni origin, as well as non-Turkic ethnic groups.
Historically, these peripheral groups were the source of defiant opposition
to the new regime and its modernization reforms in the early decades of the
Republic, with ethnic as well as religious bases. 
At no stage in Republican electoral history have the “centrist” parties
formed the largest and most dominant group. In fact, with the exception of
short-lived coalition governments, the representatives of the “centrist”
coalition have not been in power over almost six decades. However, the
establishment has always felt that centrist and founding principles of the
Republic have strong backing, even among the challengers of the “center”
in the periphery. Moreover, the elite establishment, with its centrist cultural
and ideological convictions, has always remained untouched and
unchallenged, even when the peripheral representatives came to power.
8Both ideologically as well as functionally, the “center” has developed a
privileged status that has been mostly autonomous, untouched, and
unchallenged throughout the multiparty era. In other words, the
ideological dominance of the center over the “peripheral” political
representatives has constantly been reassuring that its core principles
would never be challenged while also guaranteeing that its social and
economic status remained aloof from rapid developments in Turkish
society. 
However, Turkish modernization gained increasing momentum
during the 1980s, when import substitution-led economic growth strategy
was abandoned in 1980, and a market-led economic liberalization program
was initiated. As a consequence, the privileged status quo of the “centrist”
coalitions has lost their upper hand in Turkish society and politics. This
new liberalization program was first governed by the Motherland Party
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), and the pro-Islamist branch of the periphery’s
original reaction was at best lukewarm, if not completely rejectionist.
However, as the liberalization program became more deeply rooted, the
constituent social groups of a new and increasingly more conservative
middle class began to search for a new political establishment that could
best respond to their needs and demands. The parties following the ANAP
and those with older peripheral roots simply failed to meet this challenge
and to respond to mass priorities. As their failure became more and more
apparent in consecutive elections, the electorate first remained fragmented
and highly volatile. Following two terms of single-party government by
ANAP, the establishment parties suffered continual electoral decline for
nearly two decades after the 1980 military coup. The rise of the pro-
Islamists coincided with their total electoral collapse in the 2002 election
and thus forms the very root of uneasiness among the “centrist”
establishment.
A major factor in this swift radical shift in the relative powers of the
parties across the ideological spectrum came following the 1980 military
regime that effectively destroyed the partisan alignments of the preceding
decades. The military regime of 1980 banned the political parties and
leaders of the earlier decades from active politics. However, four years after
the first post-coup election in 1983, all the parties of the chaotic 1970s had
9been re-established under their old leadership. Within a decade, it became
clear that the electoral balance of the 1970s had shifted in favor of the once
marginal parties of the Islamist tradition, resulting in the decline of the
center-right. The left managed to retain nearly one-third of the vote but lost
its distinctly leftist ideological twist of the 1970s. While the right-wing
establishment of ANAP and the DYP lost credibility due to corruption
scandals, the once marginal pro-Islamist elements within the peripheral
tradition slowly gained ground. Following what is called the “post-modern
coup” of February 28, 1997, when the military commanders forcefully
made demands on the civilian government during a meeting of the MGK
and the RP was forced out of government without the direct use of arms,
the new-generation Islamists founded the AKP, parting ways with the
older generation’s leadership of the RP, which had continued as the Virtue
Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP). Eventually, both the RP and the FP were closed
down by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that they were against
the secularist principles of the Republic. 
This experience of continual conflicts and eventual party closures left
its mark on the new cadres of the AKP, which adopted a much more
flexible and cooperative political style. This allowed them to engage
politically with the secularist establishment, the military, and business
circles. Although limited in scope, this engagement allowed them to come
to power and, more importantly, to govern. The ability to govern is what
distinguishes the AKP from its pro-Islamist predecessors. 
The 2002 election followed a series of devastating crises that required
immediate response from the executive office. Such expectations were
never effectively met by the ruling coalition governments. First, in 1999,
two earthquakes hit the country’s most developed provinces, Istanbul and
Kocaeli. Despite their wealth and economic development, these provinces
were unable to respond to the urgent needs of the suffering masses after
the devastating earthquakes. Then the economic crisis of 2001 resulted in
unprecedented high unemployment among the urban, white-collar
communities. The resulting deep alienation of the masses from the parties
of the ruling coalition emerged with ruinous impact in the 2002 elections.
In 2002, the AKP was able to convince voters that they could perform
better than their mostly “centrist” competitors. As a consequence of the
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historic failures of the right-wing peripheral establishment, the AKP
captured about one-third of the popular vote but a clear majority of
parliamentary seats, since only one other party, the CHP, was able to pass
the ten percent threshold and gain parliamentary representation. Thus, for
the first time since the early 1980s, the AKP came to power alone,
controlling a comfortable majority in the TBMM. Such a firm grasp over
executive power increased fears by the “center” establishment that the
Islamist periphery was about to take over the Republican regime and
perhaps slowly turn it against secularist principles, building a new regime
on non-Kemalist principles. 
The sources of such fears can be found within the self-isolationist
cultural nature of the “center.” Over the last two decades, the peripheral
forces of Islamist background, as well as those of Kurdish ethnicity, have
increasingly challenged the “centrist” status quo, both inside and outside
the parliamentary political arena. While the “center” increasingly shrank
from an electoral perspective and isolated itself within the rhetoric of
bureaucratic circles, the Islamist periphery adopted new strategies and
expanded its sphere of influence. The Kurdish ethnic resistance first
adopted a militarized strategy but altered its strategy after the capture of
its leader in 1999 and the changing international climate, especially
following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As a result, in 2007 it for the first
time supported independent candidates for parliament. 
Thus, the “center” of the Turkish polity found itself increasingly
under pressure from the ethnic and Islamist “periphery,” which for the first
time is strongly represented in parliament. This undeniably marks a
turning point. For some, this is a turn for the better, since it clearly reflects
increasing representation of a larger-than-ever electoral constituency in
Republican institutions via competitive elections. For others, this is the
beginning of the end of the Republican institutions, which have opened
themselves up for a takeover by the Islamist and separatist Kurdish forces.
The latter in particular are seen to be acting with greater audacity since the
establishment of the de facto Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq
following the U.S.-led invasion and in the context of the EU adjustment
reforms required for Turkey to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. 
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The Immediate Election Context
The sensitivity over the presidential election did not only reflect a
deep cultural cleavage separating the secularist “center” from the
increasingly more religious and Islamist periphery; it also represented a
clear struggle to capture the political arena from ailing “centrist” political
parties and to prove to the masses that a new party of the “periphery” can
also govern the country. Given its success in the economic sphere, by early
2007 the general election seemed almost impossible for the AKP to lose.
However, by early June, following the presidential election debacle with
military’s involvement and large protests in urban areas, the situation
seemed to have dramatically changed to allow confident prediction of the
outcome. 
The whole campaign period can be briefly summarized as an attempt
by the “centrist” circles to defend their social and political turf, if necessary
by scare tactics. Meanwhile, the incumbent representatives of the periphery
maneuvered with the aim first, of holding on to their core constituency and
second, of expanding it further against their competitors from the same
peripheral electoral traditions. Some bureaucratic, secularist civilian circles,
as well as some of the parties rooted in the peripheral movements,
coalesced within the “center” against the incumbent AKP. The latter
depended heavily on its successful performance, especially in the economic
sphere. After the strange debacle of the presidential election, it slightly
adopted a rhetoric of the wronged and oppressed. This light dose of
underdog rhetoric was necessary since a bolder tone would signal
clumsiness on the part of a dominant parliamentary force such as the AKP.
The most important development shaping the election strategy of the
“centrist” coalition was the protest meetings or the so-called “republic
rallies.” Millions of protestors marched in all major cities, promoting a
d e m a n d  fo r  p ro te c t ion  of  secu lar is t  pr in c ip les  ag ain st
infringements—imagined or real—by the ruling government. It is difficult
to analyze the constituent groups of these protest meetings. However,
given the election results and some data collected in their aftermath, it is
not possible to claim that these meetings had a nationwide appeal.  It seems7
that the driving force behind these meetings came mostly from the urban,
economically stagnant middle class, especially women and Alevi groups.
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The protestors claimed that the long-term viability of the secular regime
was being threatened by the AKP government, which aimed to capture all
the institutions of the Republican regime and eventually to transform them
into a new, less strictly secular—if not wholly Islamist—regime. 
The main debate was thus about the nature of the regime. Very little
else concerning the negotiations with the EU, poverty alleviation, or
policies towards Iraq and the northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities was talked
about in the campaign. Some attention was drawn to alleged corruption in
the AKP government, but even these allegations did not capture much
attention. Besides the threat to the Republican regime, the two most
important campaign issues were unemployment, which had not gone away
despite persistent economic growth, and the terror and national security
related to the militarized action by the separatist insurgents in east and
southeastern Anatolia. The loss of lives to ethnic terror was on the rise,
turning the public against the AKP government but also spreading a
feeling of insecurity and isolation, especially with the increasing allegations
that the Kurdish separatist PKK was being protected and supported by the
U.S. forces in Iraq. The EU reform and negotiation process had effectively
stopped. The country was becoming politically polarized and increasingly
alienated from the West. 
Given high growth and low inflation, the government’s overall
performance was comfortable. Persistently high unemployment was
primarily due to a rapid increase in the labor force rather than to an
inability to create jobs by the AKP government. Continual current account
deficits due to the overvalued Turkish lira and high interest rates did not
seem to worry the players in the Turkish economy much. International
financial markets had abundant funds to finance this deficit with high real
returns in the Turkish money markets. 
The rise in PKK-related terror seems to have fueled the National
Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP)’s organization and
mobilized its constituency. This nationalist rejuvenation was most
significant in the western provinces where the MHP has not traditionally
done well. The continued conflict also seems to have pushed some
segments of Kurdish-origin votes in the east and southeast towards the
AKP. Despite some negative impact due to terror losses, among all the
13
competing parties the AKP had the highest credibility in terms of finding
any kind of solution to the conflict.  8
Entering the electoral campaign the expectation was that threats to
secularism or the presidential election debacle would be used intensively
by the parties. However, both issues were very divisive. The debate about
threats to secularism and the protest meetings had the potential to alienate
conservative circles. The presidential election issue could only help the
AKP win votes by the party claiming that they were the wronged
underdogs. The right-wing party establishment was trying to appeal to the
AKP’s conservative constituency and did not dare touch these issues much.
Staying alone on this matter, the CHP campaign was ineffective in
expanding its vote on the basis of these issues. 
II. HYPOTHESES AND DATA
Several hypotheses underline the above discussion about the bases
of party choice in the Turkish elections of 2007.  The first concerns9
pragmatic economic evaluations. Given the relatively successful economic
performance of the AKP government during its tenure since the 2002
general elections, a reward mechanism is expected to be in effect. Two
versions of the reward or punishment mechanism are to be tested below.
One concerns the pocketbook as opposed to sociotropic evaluations, and
the other concerns the timeframe of the evaluations. If the individual
evaluations concern personal or family finances, the pocketbook version is
at work. The sociotropic version exists when individuals’ subjective
judgments are made about the state of the whole country’s economic
conditions. Both the pocketbook and the sociotropic versions can be of
retrospective as opposed to prospective nature. Given the expected
shortsighted nature of these evaluations, only the past twelve months are
used here, as opposed to the future twelve months, in both pocketbook as
well as sociotropic evaluations. It is expected that those individuals who
possess positive evaluations of government economic performance for the
retrospective or prospective pocketbook or sociotropic evaluations should
be more inclined to vote for the incumbent AKP instead of the opposition.
Given the ideological influences within the center-periphery
framework, it is expected that not only the conventional left-right
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ideological self-placements but also similar stands along various religiosity
or conservatism scales are significant in shaping the vote choice. The more
an individual reflects peripheral ideological orientations by displaying
relatively more religious or conservative stands, the more he or she should
be inclined to vote for the parties of the periphery as opposed to the parties
of the center. As such, the AKP and the MHP should benefit from rising
right-wing, conservative, or religious tendencies, at the expense of the
CHP.
Distinct peripheral characteristics of ethnic and sectarian natures
should also have significant influences. Alevism, for instance, should raise
the likelihood of a vote for the CHP, while Kurdish ethnic background
should push individuals more towards the AKP and the independent
candidates of the Kurdish DTP.
Controlling for various demographic elements, it is expected that
generational differences should play a significant role in differentiating
party constituencies. Similarly, differences between men and women and
between relatively rich and relatively poor voters are expected to be
significant in shaping party constituencies. 
The Appendix below contains the operationalization details of all
variables used in the analyses. The data was obtained from the Turkish
election panel survey. The first wave of the panel was conducted in late
June and early July 2007, prior to the July 22 elections, and the second wave
was conducted in August-September 2007.  The dependent variable for10
party choices is obtained from the reported party choice in the first wave.11
The nature of the panel design is such that in the second wave of interviews
some respondents reached in the first wave could not be reached in the
second wave. The first wave allows the obtaining of vote intentions. The
realized vote choice is only obtained in the second wave. While in the first
the uncertainty about the election outcome continues, in the second the
results of the election are known. Accordingly, in the second wave there is
a tendency among the respondents to report their vote choice in the
election in favor of the perceived winners or the larger parties. 
Table 1 reports the correspondence of the vote intention in the first
wave and the reported vote choice in the second. What is observed here is
that  the  AKP  constituency  captured  in  the  pre-election  wave  remains
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Table 1. VOTE REPORTED IN PRE- AND POST-ELECTION WAVES
Post-Election Reported Vote Decision
Pre-election
intention AKP CHP MHP Independents No Response
AKP 91 1 1 1 5 100
CHP 12 69 6 1 12 100
MHP 11 3 75 1 9 100
Independents 27 7 0 57 10 100
Undecided 40 14 10 3 33 100
60 14 12 3 11 100
Pre-Election vote intentions after using post-election declarations of those
who were undecided in the first wave about their party:  AKP  47%; CHP
15%;  MHP 9%; Independents 3%; Undecided 9%; No response 17%. 
committed to their pre-election declarations. Ninety-one percent of the first
wave declarations for the AKP are reportedly realized at the ballot box as
vote choice, and only about five percent of the same group refuses to
declare their vote choice in the second wave. However, for the CHP only
69 percent declare a realized vote choice that corresponds to their pre-
election intentions. For the MHP, this proportion is about 75 percent, and
for the group of independents only 57 percent. Refusals in the second wave
for the CHP, MHP, and independent voters tend to be about twice the rate
obtained for the AKP voters, suggesting a relatively greater degree of
uneasiness to reveal their vote choice after a clear dominant AKP vote in
the election. Practically, this loss of responses due to the two-wave nature
of the panel interview design is remedied by using the post-election
declarations of the undecided voters in the first wave. This way, about five
percent of the sample lost as undecided in the first wave can be gained by
using the declarations in the second wave. The resulting sample
distribution of party vote that forms the basis of the dependent variables
used in the ensuing analyses is also reported in Table 1. It is observed here
that the sample under-represents the CHP and the MHP constituencies by
a small margin but almost perfectly reflects the share of the AKP vote
among those for whom there are party choice responses. As will be noted
below in greater detail, the group of supporters for the independent
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candidates is also smaller than their realized shares in the total national
vote. However, the demographic nature of this constituency conforms to
expectations.
A two-step procedure is followed in order to differentiate the
demographic bases of electoral support from more subtle ideological bases
of support. First, analyses with only demographic variables are provided.
As a second step, a number of variables that help control for ideological
orientations, family socialization into politics, and preferences for critical
issues on the public agenda are added. The first step in this analysis focuses
on demographic characteristics over which respondents carry little or no
effective control. In other words, no voter gets to choose his or her sex, age,
ethnic, or even sectarian background. The fact that one is at a given level
of education is to be taken for granted over the short run. Similarly, the fact
that one is unemployed may have very little to do with what one does over
the short run to find a job. As such, descriptive analyses as to where each
party constituency is likely to reside among the body of voters are
provided. The results of this first stage of analysis are provided in Table 2.
Logistic regression is used throughout these analyses.  The12
dependent variable can only have two values or categories, such as vote for
a given party (the “success” category coded as 1) or vote for the rest or
either one of the other parties (coded as 0). The results reveal the extent to
which the individuals that are described by the independent variables are
likely to be in the category of interest (vote for a particular party) as
opposed to the others while holding all other independent variables
constant. For example, in column 1 of Table 2, all non-AKP voters (coded
as 0) are treated separately from AKP voters (coded as 1). The figures
indicate the odds ratios, which indicate how more or less likely an
individual is to vote for the AKP as compared to any other party. A ratio
less (greater) than 1 indicates that the likelihood of voting for the reference
category parties is greater (smaller) than the likelihood of voting for the
AKP. Accordingly, negative impact upon likelihood of voting for the
“success” category is reflected by an odd ratio value less than unity. A
positive impact results in an odds ratio value that is greater than unity. All
such evaluations in the changes of likelihood in response to changes in the
independent   variables   are   evaluated   in   comparison  to  the  reference
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Table 2. PARTY DIFFERENCES BY TO DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
1 2 3 4









Age 0.98 1.04 0.99 0.98
Women=1 1.02 1.70 0.43 0.45
Education 0.68 1.79 1.09 1.06
Urban=1 1.01 0.82 0.86 2.00
Unemployed=1 1.29 0.54 1.08 1.19
Alevi=1 0.53 3.96 0.62 0.41
Kurdish=1 1.33 0.52 0.11 15.17
Constant 11.18 0.00 0.23 0.02
Model Summary
-2 Log likelihood 1847.4 1189.0 947.5 324.6
Cox & Snell R Square 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.06
Nagelkerke R Square 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.24
Overall correctly predicted %* 61.0 83.0 88.5 96.7
Correctly predicted occurrence %* 79.7 10.0 0.0 0.0
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (Sig.) 0.42 0.35 0.44 0.48
N= 1413 1413 1413 1413
* Significance at .05 printed in bold.
category defined by the independent variables. For example, in Table 1 the
odds ratio for the Alevi dummy variable is 0.53 under the first column
comparing the AKP with the rest of the parties. This indicates that holding
all other independent variables constant, an Alevi voter’s likelihood of
voting for the AKP is only 53 percent of the likelihood of a non-Alevi voter
to vote for the AKP.  13
Several patterns are worthy of note here. Older voters tend to be
more likely to be CHP voters while younger voters are more likely to vote
for independent candidates. Every decade added to voters’ age renders
them nearly forty percent more likely to be CHP voters as opposed to any
one of the other parties. Aging seems to have no significant impact upon
neither the MHP nor independents. The urban-rural divide or unemployed
status seems to make no significant impact upon the likelihood of vote for
any one of the party constituencies. While sex difference is not significant
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for the AKP, women tend to favor the CHP, while men are more likely to
vote for the MHP and the independents than women are. Similarly,
increasing education level decreases the likelihood of voting for the AKP
but increases the likelihood of voting for the CHP. Alevis are slightly less
than twice as likely to vote for a party other than the AKP. However, an
Alevi is nearly four times more likely to choose the CHP compared to
another party. Kurdish background seems not to be a significant factor
determining vote for the AKP after controlling for other demographic
factors. It reduces the likelihood of voting for the CHP and MHP
considerably while making the likelihood of voting for an independent
candidate nearly fifteen times more likely compared to other parties. 
The nonlinear nature of the likelihood estimates for different parties
within the logistic regression framework reveals interesting patterns.
Figure 1 below focuses on just one of these and shows the interaction of
Alevism and the level of education upon the likelihood of voting for
different parties.  The nonlinear nature of the progression of the14
likelihoods is clearly apparent in the picture. As the level of education rises
from the lowest level of illiterates up to the highest level of university
graduates, the likelihood of voting for the AKP declines slowly at first and
increasingly faster as the level of education rises. The likelihood of a CHP
vote increases slowly at first and faster afterwards as levels of education
approach the peak. After controlling for all other demographic factors, a
non-Alevi remains more likely to be an AKP voter compared to all other
parties, even after raising the level of education to its peak. 
However, when Alevism is added into the picture, significant shifts
are observed not only in the levels of likelihood of voting for different
parties; the relative standings of these likelihoods are altered significantly
after certain levels of education. For example, prior to secondary school the
likelihood of voting for the AKP remains dominant over all others but
continuously declines, while likelihoods of voting for other parties rise. At
the level of secondary school, the likelihood of voting for the AKP and CHP
are almost equal for Alevis after controlling for other demographic factors.
For high school, university, and beyond, the likelihood of voting for the
CHP by an Alevi is considerably higher than it is for the AKP or any other
party. In other words, level of education without Alevism does not seem
to give the CHP any significant advantage in the eyes of voters. Among 
the Alevis with relatively low levels of education, the CHP also does not 
seem to have an advantageous position. Only after secondary school 
and beyond does the CHP dominate the vote likelihoods among Alevis. 
From an optimistic perspective this may be taken as a sign that among 
the largest and relatively lower education groups, sectarian differences 
do not seem to provide a significant cleavage among the parties or 
change their relative standings in the eyes of voters. Only after the 
approximately 11 years of schooling that allow a typical Turkish voter to 
graduate from high school do sectarian differences change the relative 
rankings of the parties and give the left-leaning and strictly secularist 
CHP a relative advantage over the others. From the perspective of the 
CHP, this may not be such good news since these relatively high levels 
of education even among the Alevi community may not be large enough 
to give the party a boost in the polls.
     A similar simulation exercise taking into account the impact of 
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Figure 1. ALEVISM AND THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON PARTY CHOICE*
*Taking only demographic factors into account.
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reveals that likely rank ordering of the parties remain largely the same as
before taking this background information into account. Figure 2 shows
that the likelihood of vote for the AKP increases slightly in a non-linear
fashion for all levels of education. Impacts in opposite direction are
observed for the CHP and MHP. A typical voter below high school
education with Kurdish background is less than 7% likely to vote for the
CHP. Likelihood to vote  for the MHP remains below 3% for all levels of
education. For the independent voters an impact of opposite direction is
observed when we introduce Kurdish background. While vote for
independent candidates is less than 3% for all education level for non-
Kurdish background voters, this likelihood increases above 25% for all
education levels. However, even those with Kurdish background are
considerably less likely to vote for the independents compared to the
incumbent AKP which is 44% likely to receive a vote from the highest level
of education with Kurdish background compared to only about 30%
likelihood to vote for the independents. 
Expanding the demographic model by adding economic evaluations,
ideological positions, socialization effects of parental party choices, and
issue preferences produces the models reported in Table 3.  The analyses15
in Table 2 only differentiate one party from the whole of the rest of the
parties. In order to compare party choice between one party and just one
other party Table 3 also includes comparisons of different party pairs. 
After taking into account economic evaluations, ideological and issue
positions, and partisan family background it is seen that the influence of
demographic variables changes significantly for only Alevism which ceases
to be significant after controlling for economic evaluations, ideological
positions, socialization effects of parental party choices, and issue
preferences. The impact of Kurdish ethnic background remains the same.
The impact of age upon the likelihood of support for the AKP is still
significant but at a smaller magnitude, suggesting that younger voters are
more likely to vote for the AKP than older generations. The CHP continues
to receive votes of older generation voters compared to all their major
competitors as well as to the MHP. Women are more likely than men to
vote for the CHP, as compared to the rest of the major parties in the system.
Similarly, when compared to the MHP women tend to be  more  likely  to
support the AKP, and women tend to prefer the CHP over the MHP. In 
other words, after a larger set of control variables the differences 
between men and women voters remain. While the CHP maintains an 
advantage over the rest of the major players in the party system, the 
MHP tends to be favored more by men rather than by women. The AKP 
does not seem to have a significant advantage between male and female 
voters. However, compared to the MHP, the AKP still possesses an 
advantage in attracting womenʹs votes. 
       The impact of education upon party choice also remains 
predominantly the same. The AKP continues to enjoy a higher 
likelihood of support among less educated voters, while the CHP tends 
to receive the votes of the more educated. The impact of Kurdish ethnic 
background upon party choice remains stable after enlarging the control 
variables. The likelihood of voting for the CHP and the MHP is lower 
among voters with Kurdish background as compared to those who do 
not have such an ethnic background. The likelihood of voting for an 
independent candidate is higher among those with a Kurdish 
background  compared  to  the  rest  of  the  major  players  in  the  party 
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Figure 2. KURDISH BACKGROUND AND THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION 
ON PARTY CHOICE*
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system. It is also worthy of note that in a comparison of the AKP with only
the independents, it is observed that independents possess a considerable
advantage among those of Kurdish ethnic background. In other words,
after controlling for the influences of other demographic factors, economic
evaluations, family socialization, and ideological and issue preferences, the
AKP does not seem to control an advantageous standing among the
citizens of Kurdish ethnic background as compared to those who are of
non-Kurdish background. This is counterintuitive since by solely looking
into geographic vote distribution and the success of the AKP in the east and
southeastern Anatolian provinces where citizens of Kurdish ethnicity are
most likely to reside, one may be led to conclude differently. However,
micro-individual level evidences at two stages of analyses refute these
expectations. After controlling for different explanatory variables, the
likelihood of voting for the AKP does not seem to possess a significant
advantageous standing among those with Kurdish ethnic background. In
other words, voters of Kurdish and non-Kurdish background with the
same demographic characteristics who hold the same economic
evaluations, the same ideological positions with the same level of religious
practice, the same parental partisan background, and who possess the same
issue preferences will not be more or less likely to be an AKP voter as
opposed to another. 
It is also observed that family socialization or partisanship influence
is significant for six of the eight party choice comparisons in Table 3. For
example, mother’s center-left partisan commitment as reflected by her vote
for the center-left parties renders the likelihood of voting for the AKP as
opposed to other parties less likely (odds ratio of 0.5). Similarly, a center-
left partisan background for the mother of the respondent makes the
likelihood of that respondent voting for the AKP as opposed to the MHP
less likely. In other words, mother’s center-left partisan background seems
to push the voters away from the AKP. However, a center-right
background has the opposite impact of pushing the voters towards the
CHP as compared to the rest of the major players as well as solely to the
MHP after controlling for the influences of all other  independent
variables.  Fathers’ partisan background of similar nature, however, has
influences in the opposite direction. A mother and a father with a center-
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Table 3. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF PARTY CHOICE 2007
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8


























Age 0.99 1.04 0.99 0.98 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.03
Women=1 1.18 1.64 0.51 0.50 0.48 1.90 1.46 2.08
Education 0.71 1.54 1.14 1.02 0.49 0.74 0.74 1.16
Alevi=1 1.31 0.89 0.72 0.32 1.30 1.62 3.04 0.67
Kurdish=1 0.85 0.47 0.17 14.00 0.88 4.10 0.07 1.89
Economic Evaluations
1.20 0.97 0.86 0.82 1.18 1.25Retrospective pocketbook 1.22 1.07
Retrospective sociotropic 1.36 0.84 0.82 0.90 1.31 1.43 1.51 0.92
Prospective pocketbook 0.91 1.06 1.07 1.15 0.94 0.86 0.84 1.01
Prospective sociotropic 1.31 0.89 0.84 0.91 1.25 1.33 1.23 1.04
Life satisfaction (0-10) 1.09 0.97 0.91 0.98 1.06 1.15 1.06 1.04
Ideological Positions
1.27 0.57 1.31 0.76 2.02 0.92 1.48 0.54Left-Right self-placement
Religious practice index 1.22 0.83 0.99 0.96 1.45 1.23 1.15 0.77
Partisan Family Background
0.89 3.16 0.57 2.58 0.37 1.45 0.21 5.19Mother's p. (Center-right)
Mother's p. (Nationalist) 0.96 0.41 1.22 0.77 1.89 0.60 1.63 0.38
Mother's p. (Center-left) 0.50 1.46 1.84 0.40 0.99 0.37 0.89 1.19
Mother's p. (Islamist) 2.20 0.28 0.35 0.35 8.99 3.58 2.67 0.88
Father's p. (Center-right) 1.96 0.26 1.25 0.44 4.64 1.11 5.97 0.21
Father's p. (Nationalist) 0.53 2.83 1.09 1.19 0.38 0.98 0.54 2.52
Father's p. (Center-left) 1.42 2.52 0.33 0.55 0.42 2.89 3.09 3.11
Father's p. (Islamist) 1.52 0.27 0.96 2.17 6.94 1.18 0.68 0.08
Most Important Issue
Terror 0.87 1.11 1.34 0.95 0.89 0.68 1.05 0.69
Kurdish problem 0.39 0.43 2.38 4.88 0.77 0.36 0.18 0.15
Shari’a based  state 1.71 0.38 0.48 1.29 3.22 1.83 1.12 1.10
Model Summary 
Constant 0.01 0.97 0.45 0.97 0.08 0.09 0.11 7.20
-2 Log likelihood 1254.3 692.5 784.1 276.3 445.7 584.7 206.0 289.1
Cox & Snell R Square 0.38 0.36 0.15 0.09 0.49 0.26 0.17 0.47
Nagelkerke R Square 0.51 0.59 0.29 0.36 0.74 0.44 0.49 0.64
Overall correctly predicted %* 79.1 90.4 90.3 97.5 91.7 87.8 96.0 84.8
Correctly predicted occurrence %* 83.9 63.7 22.7 27.7 95.9 97.3 99.4 89.2
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (Sig.) 0.75 0.65 0.81 0.11 0.80 0.44 0.02 0.50
N= 1413 1413 1413 1413 1057 969 853 414
Significance at .05 printed in bold.
24
right partisan background renders the likelihood of their offspring more
likely to vote non-CHP (father’s impact [pushing the vote towards the
other parties with an odds ratio of 3.84] will dominate the mother’s
[pushing the vote towards the CHP with an odds ratio of 3.16]). Comparing
the CHP with only the MHP, however, it is observed that the mother’s
center-right partisan background’s impact is more dominant (pushing the
vote towards the CHP with an odds ratio of 5.19 as opposed to the father’s
pushing the vote towards the MHP with an odds ratio of 4.76). In other
words, when mother and father both have a center-right partisan
background, their offspring is more likely to vote non-CHP as opposed to
other major players and CHP as opposed to the MHP. 
A similar evaluation for mothers and fathers having a center-left
partisan background reveals that in comparing the AKP with only the
MHP, the offspring is more likely to vote for the AKP following his/her
father’s dominant influence. Fathers’ center-left partisan background alone
also pushes their offspring more towards the CHP and away from the MHP
as compared to the rest of the major players in the system. In other words,
a center-left partisan background for their parents pushes voters away from
the MHP.
A noticeable pattern is also that neither the mothers’ nor the fathers’
nationalist or Islamist partisan background seems to have any significant
influence upon their offspring’s party choices. This may be due to the fact
that parents of such partisan background comprise only between six to nine
percent of the sample, too small a group for a meaningful judgment. It may
also concurrently be a reflection of the fact that the once large and
dominant center-left and right party constituencies are undergoing a major
transformation in their partisan bases. As such, parents’ from these centrist
partisan backgrounds are more likely to exhort some influence upon party
choices of their children at turbulent times of partisan realignment.
Positions on two issues appear to have significant influence upon
party choice. One involves the group of voters who see the Kurdish
problem as the country’s most important problem and the other is
comprised of voters who approve of a Shari’a-based religious state in the
country. The group of voters who choose terror as the country’s most
important problem appear to have no differentiating influence upon party
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choice. The group of voters who choose the Kurdish problem as the most
important problem of the country comprises about five percent of the
sample, and its members are about 2.4 times more likely to vote for the
MHP as opposed to others, while for the same group, voting for the non-
AKP parties is more than 2.5 times likely (1/0.39=2.56), as compared to
likelihood of voting for the AKP. The issue position advantage in favor of
the MHP becomes more apparent when  only the comparison of the AKP
versus the MHP choice is considered, where voting for the MHP is more
than 2.7 times likely (1/0.36=2.78) as compared to the likelihood of voting
for the AKP among this group that includes the “Kurdish problem” in its
list of most important problems for the country. A similar advantage of the
MHP also exists when the party choice is only between the CHP and the
MHP, and the likelihood of a MHP vote is 6.66 times more likely
(1/0.15=6.66). In other words, the perception the “Kurdish problem” as one
of the most important problems of the country works in favor of the MHP
as compared to the AKP and hurts the AKP against all, but especially the
nationalist MHP.
Another issue preference that has significant impact upon party
choice is concerned with approval of a Shari’a-based religious state in
Turkey. This group of voters who approve of a Shari’a-based religious state
in the country comprise about 13 percent of the sample, and their
likelihood of voting for the AKP as compared to all other major players
(odds ratio 1.71) or only the CHP (odds ratio 3.22) is significantly higher.
However, it is worthy of note that party choice between the AKP and the
MHP or independents are not significantly influenced for this group who
approve of a Shari’a-based religious state in Turkey.  16
Evaluation of the impact of ideological positions is included in party
choice equations via two variables. One is through self-placement along the
conventional left-right scale. The other is through an index of subjective
religious commitment that uses reported frequency of religious worship or
practice as its basis. This index shows a linear increase as the subjective
reported frequency of religious practice increases (see Appendix for
details). 
It is seen that as an individual moves toward the right end of the
conventional left-right scale he or she is more likely to vote for the AKP as
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compared to all its competitors except the MHP. That is to say that as there
is movement along the left-right ideological self-placement scale, the
likelihood of voting for the AKP as opposed to the MHP does not change
after controlling for the influences of the other independent variables. This
suggests that ideologically the AKP and the MHP are very similar when
keeping the other independent variables constant. However, a similar
movement to the right-end of the ideological spectrum makes the
likelihood of voting for the CHP and independents decline significantly. A
movement to the right end of the ideological spectrum reduces the
likelihood of voting for the CHP in comparison to the MHP as well. In
other words, movements along the left-right ideological spectrum as
perceived by the respondents themselves make their likelihood of voting
for the parties change in an expected manner. That is, when an individual
moves to the right (left) he or she becomes more likely to vote for a right
(left)-wing party such as the AKP or the MHP (the CHP) after controlling
for the influences of the other independent variables.
Increasing subjective religious commitment or frequency of reported
religious practice raises the likelihood of voting for the AKP as compared
to all its competitors except for the independent candidates. This suggests
that the constituencies of the independents and the AKP are similar when
it comes to subjective religious commitment or reported worship practice.
Similar increases in the frequency of religious worship practice decreases
the likelihood of voting for the CHP as compared to the rest of its
competitors, as well as to the MHP alone. However, increasing reported
frequency of religious practice does not influence the likelihood of voting
for the MHP or independents as compared to the rest of their competitors.
Similarly, increasing frequency of religious worship practice does not
influence the likelihood of voting in favor of the AKP in comparison to the
independent candidates.
The last group of evaluations concerns the government’s performance
in the economic sphere. Retrospective and prospective evaluations are
obtained from a sociotropic perspective where the respondent is asked to
make judgments about the Turkey’s conditions in general as opposed to a
pocketbook perspective, where judgments are asked about the nature of the
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government’s economic policies have upon your 
FAMILY’S economic condition? 
Very bad effect










                                                             27
zero to ten (11-point) scales. Figure 3 and 4 provide mean evaluation 
scores for all four of these economic evaluations for the whole sample as
well as for different party constituencies. 
        When we look at Figure 3 showing the nation-wide sample 
averages we see no significant pattern other than a slight positive
tendency in average evaluations. Retrospective pocketbook or 
sociotropic evlations are slightly less favorable compared to prospective 
evaluations of both types. However, when we focus on different party 
constituencies and their evaluations in a comparative setting we see 
significant patterns.
        What is striking in Figure 4 is the marked partisan divide in 
average judgments. On all four, the AKP constituency is well above the 
countrywide average while the opposition mean scores are all below.
Another striking pattern is that AKP voters have the highest evaluations
for sociotropic versions of the questions both retrospectively as well as 
prospectively while the opposition parties differ in terms of time 
hor iz on  for  the i r  eva lua t ions .  For  a l l  three  oppos i t ion 


































Figure 4. MEAN ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS, POLITICAL PARTY 
CONSTITUENCIES
than retrospective ones. While for the left-leaning CHP the pocketbook 
and sociotropic versions are about the same, for the MHP and 
supporters of independent candidates, the sociotropic version 
persistently reflects better evaluations. 
        The most persistent significant impact is observed for the 
retrospective sociotropic evaluations followed by prospective 
sociotropic ones. Prospective pocketbook evaluations are insignificant 
in differentiating all party constituencies. Prospective sociotropic 
evaluations seem to matter for primarily differentiating the AKP from 
its competitors—except the independents. Deteriorating evaluations 
increase the likelihood of support for the opposition  while  
ameliorating ones help the incumbent AKP in all comparisons where 
prospective sociotropic evaluations are significant. It is striking to 
observe that the CHP and independent candidatesʹ support depend the 
least upon economic evaluations. For the CHP, only retrospective 
sociotropic evaluations have a significant and negative impact. No 
significant influence from the economic evaluations is observed for the 
independent candidates. 
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A summary evaluation for performance evaluations can be observed
for the life satisfaction evaluations. It is observed that improvements in
these help the incumbent and only hurt the MHP in opposition. Support for
the CHP and independent candidates is not significantly influenced by this
variable. Although the focus upon ethnic identity politics by almost all
independent candidates renders this finding understandable for their case,
the insignificance of economic evaluations for three out of four different
types of evaluations is curious for the case of the CHP. This may be a
blessing for times when economic evaluations are on average on the
positive side, since then at least no significant loss of electoral support will
be incurred. However, if this is a sign that the CHP constituency is not
differentiable from the rest in terms of differences in economic performance
evaluations, it becomes more dramatic and significant to understand the
nature of the left-wing constituency, especially at times when economic
conditions may not be rosy.  
A question of particular significance for understanding the nature of
Turkish electoral democracy concerns the relative magnitudes of
ideological as opposed to pragmatic economic evaluations upon party
choice.  The simplest way of evaluating the relative importance of these17
two groups of variables is by checking the magnitude of their impact upon
the odds ratio of support for different parties. It is observed, for example,
that for the case of the AKP when economic evaluations are significant in
shaping party preference at least one of these has its odds ratio magnitude
larger than variables reflecting ideological predispositions. However, the
nonlinear nature of the logistic regression may lead to a misleading
conclusion, depending upon where other independent variables might be
for the average respondent.  To bypass these difficulties, various scenario
evaluations are conducted. One such exercise that is particularly rewarding
is reported below in Figures 3, which shows the likelihood of voting for the
AKP for the whole range of values that correspond to two of the most
persistently significant variables—that is, the retrospective sociotropic
economic evaluations and the left-right self placement at two different
levels of education, the first one for the illiterate group and the other for
university graduates.
Besides the effective nonlinearity what is striking in these pictures
30
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concerns the influence of education level in mediating the impact of left-
right ideology and retrospective sociotropic evaluation upon the likelihood
of voting for the AKP. For the illiterate group, it is observed that someone
who positions himself at the left-most position (1) and also gives a low
retrospective economic evaluation of 1 is only about ten percent likely to
vote for the AKP.   By keeping this individual at the left-most position and18
increasing his retrospective economic evaluations from 1 to 10, it is
observed that his likelihood of voting for the AKP rises to about 60 percent.
A similar evaluation for the university graduates group shows that the
most leftist male voter with a low (1) sociotropic economic evaluation starts
from about a two percent likelihood of voting for the AKP (about one-fifth
of the likelihood of the comparable illiterate voter, who is ten percent likely
to vote for the AKP) and slowly rises to about 21 percent likelihood
(slightly more than about one-third the likelihood of a comparable illiterate
voter). Tracing the impact of ideological shift from the left-most to the
right-most at the highest level of sociotropic evaluations (10) for the
university graduates, it is observed that the likelihood to vote increases
from about 21 percent to about 70 percent (about three-fourths the
likelihood of the comparable illiterate voter, who is 93 percent likely to vote
for the AKP). Comparing the two likelihood surfaces of voting for the AKP
for the illiterate and university graduate groups, it is observed that
ideology is more constraining for the higher education group than it is for
the lower education group, whose members are more under the influence
of their subjective sociotropic economic evaluations. 
A typical illiterate individual in the middle of the ideological
spectrum (at 5 on left-right scale) and at the undecided middle point of the
retrospective sociotropic economic evaluations (at 5 on the scale) is about
46 percent likely to vote for the AKP. Any movement from that midpoint
towards the right of the ideological spectrum quickly increases his
likelihood of voting for the AKP to above 50 percent. A similar tipping
point for university graduates towards more than 50 percent likelihood of
voting for the AKP comes at a much later stage of positive economic
evaluations (8-9 on the retrospective sociotropic evaluations scale) only for
individuals at the right-end of the left-right ideological spectrum (8-9 on
the left-right scale). In other words, while the illiterate non-Alevi and non-
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Kurdish males of about 35 years of age with parents who had voted for the
center-left parties in the past become more likely to vote for the AKP than
for any one of their competitors when they pass the midpoints on the left-
right scale towards the right-end and come to evaluate the government’s
performance in the past year for the whole country more and more
favorably. A similar switch towards the AKP comes at a much later stage
of right-wing ideological predispositions and positive retrospective
sociotropic economic evaluations for university graduates. 
Similar simulations for the likelihood of vote according to the above
reported estimates are obtained for the CHP as well as the MHP. For the
CHP the impact of ideology is much more significant for the university
group compared to the lowest level of education. For example, in order to
observe a likelihood of vote for the CHP higher than 50% at the lowest level
of retrospective sociotropic economic evaluations we see that the individual
has to place him or herself at 3 or below on the left-right self-placement
scale. In other words, despite very favorable negative evaluations about the
state of the economy we see that unless voters are also ideologically
opposing the AKP their likelihood of vote for the CHP is not above 50%
likelihood. As retrospective sociotropic economic evaluations get better the
likelihood of vote for the CHP rapidly declines to insignificant levels. 
However, for the group of university graduates we see that the
influence of ideology remains more effective. For example at the lowest
level of retrospective sociotropic economic evaluations a typical individual
remains more than 50% likely to vote for the CHP even if he or she picks
a point up to 7 on the left-right scale. So, he or she need not be ideologically
close to the CHP but would still approach the CHP positively likely to vote.
Nevertheless we continue to observe that as retrospective sociotropic
economic evaluations get better even at the highest level of education the
likelihood of vote for the CHP drops below 50% very quickly beyond the
level of 7 on the left-right scale. For example at the mid point of the left-
right scale if an individual has the lowest retrospective sociotropic
economic evaluations his or her likelihood of vote for the CHP is slightly
above 70%. As this individual’s economic evaluations ameliorate his or her
likelihood drops below 50% and reaches the lowest level of about 43% at
the highest level of economic evaluations. 
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When we look at the picture of simulation results for the MHP we
observe that its likelihood of vote never rises above 50% for any
combination of ideological position and economic evaluations. For the
illiterate group, even at the far right end of the left-right spectrum and at
the lowest possible economic evaluation, we see that the likelihood of vote
for the MHP rather than any other party is about 35%. The same position
for a university graduate raises this likelihood to about 50%. However, for
all other combinations we observe less than 50% likelihood to pick the
MHP compared to all other parties.
An interesting comparison is to set the AKP as opposed to only the
MHP rather than the rest of the whole electorate. Figure 8 shows such
comparisons for the illiterate and university graduates group. We see that
the AKP’s vote likelihood at the lowest economic evaluation level is above
50% up to about the mid-point of the left-right scale. Right of the middle
with low economic evaluations seem to shift voters towards the MHP.
However, even at the lowest economic evaluations and the right-most
position we see that typical voters are about 44% likely to vote for the AKP.
As their ideological positions move towards the middle their likelihood
quickly rises above 50% in favor of the AKP and away from the MHP.
The impact of education in strengthening of the ideological
predispositions become clearer when we look at the university graduates
 group comparing only the AKP and MHP.  Among the university
graduates the surface of the likelihood of vote for the AKP is such that as
economic evaluations get better university graduates at all ideological
positions become more likely to vote for the AKP compared to the MHP.
This is similar to the lowest education level of illiterates but much more
pronounced. However, as university graduates move from left to right at
all economic evaluation levels we also observe that they become less likely
to vote for the AKP compared to the MHP. In other words, controlling for
the economic evaluation levels, shifting ideological positions from left to
right render university graduates less likely to vote for the AKP and more
likely to vote for the MHP. 
We see that for points below 3 on the retrospective sociotropic
economic evaluation scale, the likelihood of vote for the AKP compared
only to the MHP is always below 43%. This suggests that these individuals
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are more likely to vote for the MHP rather than the AKP after controlling
for all impacts of the other variables in the model. At the highest education
level it seems like unfavourable economic evaluations renders people more
likely to support the MHP compared to the AKP irrespective of their
ideological commitments. This is not surprising since we do not expect
much of a differentiation on ideological grounds for the AKP and MHP
voters. 
In a sense the shape of this surface of probabilities resemble the case
of the illiterate group for the AKP compared to the rest of the electorate in
Figure 5. Such a shape suggests that only with right-wing ideological
predispositions coupled with low economic evaluations does the likelihood
of support for the MHP rises above that of the AKP.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Several characteristics of voter profiles of major party constituencies
arise from the above analyses of the July 2007 election in Turkey. First, it is
observed that younger voters tend towards the AKP and older ones for the
opposition parties. Women are more likely to vote for the CHP and not for
the MHP. Keeping all else constant and comparing the AKP and the MHP,
women tend to vote for the AKP. Hence it seems that the AKP has a
distinct advantage among women over only the MHP, which is unable to
appeal to women as  compared to any other party. Education level is
significant in differentiating party constituencies. All else kept constant,
lower education groups tend to vote for the AKP, and higher education
groups tend towards the CHP and the MHP. Among the identity variables,
Alevism ceases to be significant when non-demographic variables are taken
into account. Kurdish ethnic background seems to push voters away from
the CHP and MHP and towards independent candidates. However,
controlling for the influences of other variables such as left-right ideology,
economic evaluations, and partisan family background, Kurdishness does
not seem to render voters more likely to vote for the AKP. In other words,
despite the AKP’s apparent dominant position at the east and southeast
Anatolian provinces, micro-individual level data indicates that Kurdish
background has no significant positive impact upon vote for the AKP after
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Islamist or nationalist partisan family background persistently
appears insignificant as an influence upon party choice. However, center-
left and right partisan family background appears significant for choosing
different parties. When mother and father both have a center-right partisan
background their offspring is more likely to vote CHP as opposed to other
major players and for the CHP as opposed to the MHP. When mothers and
fathers have a center-left partisan background and if the AKP is compared
with only the MHP, the offspring appears more likely to vote for the AKP.
Center-left partisan background of fathers alone also pushes their offspring
more towards the CHP and away from the MHP compared to the rest of
the major players in the system. In short, when only parental partisan
background is the focus,  the center-left and right inclination of an earlier
generation voters—that is, the present voters’ parents—seem to diverge
away from the older generation centrist parties and rather effectively push
their offspring towards the newer generation represented by the AKP.
However, the older generation’s polarization between the CHP and the
MHP still continues to be effective. 
Non-economic issues such as the approval of Shari’a rule or the
Kurdish problem have different impacts upon the ruling AKP as opposed
to the opposition parties. While terror as the most important issue of the
country appears insignificantly related to any party choice, the impact of
a perceived Kurdish problem deteriorates the likelihood of voting for the
AKP. Although a relatively smaller group compared to the early 2000s,
those who would approve of a Shari’a-based religious state in Turkey are
more likely to vote for the AKP than any other party. 
Economic issues or evaluation of the government’s economic policy
performance as well as the two ideological variables appear most
persistently significant in shaping voter decision. Evaluating the relative
importance of these two groups of variables is tricky. Taking each variable
into account alone, it is observed that retrospective sociotropic evaluations
have the largest and most persistent impact on most party choice decisions.
However, when different scenarios of variable interactions are evaluated,
it is observed that education level differentiates the magnitude of influence
upon party choice by retrospective sociotropic evaluations. As expected, at
higher levels of education pragmatic economic evaluations are less effective
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than they are for groups at lower levels of education.
Short- to mid-term implications of these findings for the electoral
dynamics in the country are complex. The only major group among which
the AKP has a significant disadvantage against its major competitor, the
CHP, is the Alevi group. The reformist initiative of the AKP aimed at
appealing to the Alevi community right after the election should thus not
be surprising. The fact that the two major competitors of the AKP—that is,
the CHP and the MHP—appear to have no appeal among the citizens of
Kurdish background is obviously helping the AKP, especially in the east
and southeastern Anatolian provinces. However, when controlling for the
ideological and other influences that shape voter decisions, the AKP
appears not to have a major sounding among the Kurdish community. This
may be one particular reason as to why the AKP does not seem to suffer
from this appeal when it campaigns in the western provinces. It seems that
the appeal of the AKP in the east and southeast is more shaped by
ideological conservative predispositions as well as economic evaluations
prevalent among the citizens of Kurdish background rather than pure
ethnic identity issues. 
The most important implication of these findings concerns the
dependence of the AKP upon favorable economic conditions or the
favorable economic performance of the AKP government. The fact that
economic pragmatism appears more significant than ideological
predispositions, especially for the AKP constituency, might be good news
for Turkish democracy. If the AKP government delivers on the economic
front then they will be continuously rewarded at the polls. However, if they
fail, then they will be swiftly punished since their constituency’s ideological
ties are relatively minor in support of the AKP. If the AKP vote were to
depend more heavily on ideology, then any failure on the economic front
could have possibly been made up by heavy reliance on ideological
mobilization, which potentially is less concrete and ambiguous. However,
the AKP does not seem to have that capacity to hold on to a core
constituency on the basis of pure ideological mobilization. Knowing these
dynamics, it could be expected that the AKP, facing deteriorating economic
prospects, would try to highlight the salience of ideological positions in the
hope of raising their positive influence upon AKP support among their core
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constituencies. However, such ideological repositioning could potentially
alienate major groups of voters, which could fail to counterbalance the loss
of votes on economic grounds. The rising salience of the issue of the turban
in public sphere may just be one such attempt on the part of the AKP
government to divert or counterbalance the negative impact of a slowly
developing economic downturn in the country due to deteriorating global
economic conditions.
The above analysis also suggests that among the highest education
group who carries the secularist resistance to the AKP the economic
evaluations are not as important as they are for the lower education
groups. These groups seem more likely to be motivated on the basis of
ideology than compared to the illiterate group fro example. This is not
surprising considering the fact that higher education group is also less
vulnerable facing economic downturn. However, the fact that more right-
wing orientation deteriorates the likelihood of vote for the AKP compared
only to the MHP is an interesting finding that needs further research. This
implies that after controlling for economic evaluations as well as other
factors just rendering people more left-wing may in fact increase their
likelihood of support for the AKP compared to the MHP. This may be the
basis for the so-called “liberal coalition” in support of the AKP. 
Appendix.  INDICATORS IN ANALYSIS
Demographic variables
Age Age in years for the respondents.
Women=1 Dummy variable equalling 1 for women and 0 for men.
Education Education level, 1=illiterate no schooling, 2=literate but no
schooling, 3=primary school, 4=secondary school, 5=high
school and 6=University (+) graduate.
Alevi=1 1 for Alevis and 0 for others.
Kurdish=1 1 for citizens of Kurdish origin and 0 for others.
Urban=1 1 for living in urban setting and 0 for men.
Unemployed=1 1 for those out of work and 0 for others.
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Economic evaluations
Retrospective pocketbook Over the last year how much of an impact did the
government’s economic policies have upon your
FAMILY’S economic condition? Please evaluate this on a 0
to 10 scale. “0” meaning a VERY BAD IMPACT, “10”
meaning VERY GOOD IMPACT. 
Retrospective sociotropic On a similar scale could you evaluate the impact of the
government policies upon TURKEY’S economic condition? 
Prospective pocketbook How will your FAMILY’S economic condition change over
the next year? Evaluate this on a 0 to 10 scale. “0” meaning
will be VERY BAD , “10” meaning will be VERY GOOD. 
Prospective sociotropic How will TURKEY’S economic condition change over the
next year? 
Life satisfaction (0-10) All things considered to what extent are you satisfied with
your life? Please use a 0 to 10 scale where “0” means that
you are not at all satisfied, and “10” means that you are
fully satisfied. 
Ideological positions
Left-Right self-placement In politics people sometimes talk abort the left and the
right. Where would you place your own views on a scale
from 1 to 10, where “1” means the left-most and “10”
means the right-most position?
Religious practice index Over the last year, other than funeral services how often
were you able to worship? 1= More than once a week, 2=
Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= In the month of
Ramadan and kandil, 5= During religious vacations, once
or twice a year, 6= Less than once a year.
Partisan  background
Mother's p. (Center-right) 1 if mother  voted  DP, AP, DYP, ANAP, MDP.
Mother's p. (Nationalist) 1 if mother  voted for the MHP, MÇP.
Mother's p. (Center-left) 1 if mother  voted for the CHP, DSP.
Mother's p. (Islamist) 1 if mother  voted for the MSP, RP, FP, or SP.
Father's p. (Center-right) 1 if father  voted for DP, AP, DYP, ANAP, MDP.
Father's p. (Nationalist) 1 if father  voted for the MHP, MÇP.
Father's p. (Center-left) 1 if father voted for the CHP, DSP.
Father's p. (Islamist) 1 if father voted for the MSP, RP, FP, or SP.
Issue positions
Terror important issue 1 if see this as one of country’s  two most important issues 
Kurdish problem
important 1 if see this as one of country’s two most important issues 
Approve of Shari’a 1 if approve a Shari'a-based religious state in Turkey
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 The election system that requires a ten percent minimum nationwide vote1
share for gaining any seats in the TBMM allows for a large representational
bias in favor of the large parties that secure more than this threshold of
support. See William Hale, “The Electoral System and the 2007 Elections:
Effects and Debates,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2008) for an account of
the election system. See Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish
Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society (I. B.
Tauris, 2007) on political parties and elections in Turkey.
 See Ali Çarkoğlu, “A New Electoral Victory for the 'Pro-Islamists' or the2
'New Centre-Right'? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in
the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey,” South European Society and
Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2007), pp. 501-19 on a review of the July 2007
election process.
 See Aylin Güney, “The People’s Democracy Party,” Turkish Studies, Vol.3
3, No.1 (2002), pp. 122-37 on Kurdish electoral politics.
 Serif Mardin, “Centre Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”4
Daedalus, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1973), pp. 169-90.
 Neither the “center” nor its complement, the “periphery,” has its pure and5
monolithic representatives. At times, both sides seem to carry traits of one
another, and their concrete political stands have constantly changed over
the years.
 The military has a long history during the Republican era of intervening,6
either directly as in 1960 and 1980 or indirectly as in 1971 and 1997 via
decrees or demands from civilians, as was the case in the incident of the
February 28, 1997 National Security Council meetings. See Hale, Turkish
politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994) for a detailed account of
the military politics relationship in Turkey.
 Data collected as part of the Turkish Election Study 2007 suggests, for7
example, that the rallies were only supported by about half the electorate.
 Data collected as part of the Turkish Election Study 2007 suggests, for8
example, that the AKP was seen as more credible than all its competitors
in dealing with terror and the Kurdish problem in the east and
southeastern Anatolian provinces. 
 A review of Turkish voting studies is beyond the scope of this article.9
However, Baslevent, C., Kirmanoğlu, H. and Senatalar, B. 2004. “Voter
Profiles and Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System”, Party Politics, 10
(3): 307-324; Esmer, Yılmaz. 2001. “At the Ballot-Box: Determinants of
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Voting Behaviour in Turkey”, in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.)
Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey. Lynn Rienner, pp.91-114 as well as
the chapters 6 and 7 in Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) are three of the
most recent relevant pieces in the literature. 
 The sampling procedure adopted took a target sample size as 2,000. First,10
the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, TUIK) NUT-1
regions are adopted, and the target sample was distributed according to
each region’s share of urban and rural population according to registered
voter records for the 2002 election. TUIK’s block data was used with block
size set at 200 residents. Ten voters were targeted to be reached from each
block. The probability proportionate to population size (PPPS) principle
was used in selecting neighborhood and villages from each TUIK-1 region
of urban and rural localities. All neighborhoods and villages were
separated into NUT-1 regions, and PPPS selection was applied to select
neighborhoods and villages. From every NUT-1 region 200 neighborhoods
and villages were selected in accordance with their urban rural shares
within each region. For every one of these randomly selected, replacements
were also picked in accordance with PPPS for cases where the ten planned
interviews could not be completed in the primary selected neighborhood
or village. From each of these neighborhoods, block addresses were
obtained from TUIK. Ten addresses from each neighborhood were given
to the fieldworkers, and all addresses were asked to be reached. When ten
interviews could not be completed after two visits to each address, the
remaining interviews were completed from the replacement block via the
same procedure. In rural areas, the selected villages were visited and
addresses were obtained from the local muhtar (headman). If ten interviews
from a village could not be completed, its replacement village was visited
and the same procedure was applied. In selecting the individual to be
interviewed from each household an alphabetical list of all residents above
the age of 18 was first formed. Then the alphabetically first name was
selected for interview. If this individual was not available for interview in
the household, a second individual in the same alphabetical order was
selected for interview. Individuals who were replacements of the first
selection were noted in the dataset for tests of significant difference. In
order to take account of cancellations after the fieldwork controls at least
two interviews were conducted from the replacement lists from each urban
block and village.
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 7.6 percent of the total sample did not want to report their party of choice11
in the second wave. Nearly two-thirds of the same group (five percent of
the sample) have, however, reported their intended party of choice in the
first wave. The author used these reported intentions from the first wave
as their party of choice to gain observations in the final analysis. These
constitute about ten percent of the observations reported in the ensuing
analyses. 
 See Scott J. Long, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent12
Variables (Sage Publications, 1997) for an accessible exposition of the logistic
regression analysis.
 The inverse of the odds ratio for the negative influences give the13
likelihood of vote for the other parties as opposed to the likelihood to vote
for the AKP. In other words, an odds ratio value of 0.53 indicates that the
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likelihood of voting for the AKP ((1/0.53)=1.89).
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Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage,” in the special issue of Turkish
Politics on “Religion and Politics in Turkey,” Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), pp. 273-92
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insignificant in this form and are dropped out of the equation. 
 However, note here that the Hoshmer-Lemeshow test is significant for16
the AKP versus Independents comparison, suggesting that the estimated
model predictions are significantly different from the real observed data.
Thus, the validity of this model is doubtful. 
 See Sahin Alpay’s article “22 Temmuz'da kim kime, niçin oy verdi?”17
[Who Voted for Whom on July 22?] in Zaman daily newspaper on
September 6, 2007, on ideology and economic pragmatism.
 For Figure 5, age is set at 35 for non-Alevi and non-Kurdish males. All18
other economic evaluations are set at the mid-level of 5, religious practice
is also set at the middle of the range at 3 for practice once a month, and
mother and father’s partisan background is set at center-left parties. No
issue impact is assumed.
